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Nuclear safety concerns can be thought of in terms of terrestrial, unmanned space
operations, manned space operations, and Moon and planetary bodies. These are
overlapping in many respects; however, there are unique aspects associated with each
area (Figure 1). For instance, for terrestrial operations, one must be concerned with the
anti-nuclear bias and the strict laws that must be adhered to in order to protect the
environment and people. For unmanned space operations, the main concerns are related
to low orbits and final disposal. Manned operations add a new class of problems
concerning the safety of the crew. For instance, if a nuclear propulsion unit fails on the
way to Mars and the crew keeps going with no way to get home, this is not acceptable.
Surface power supplies have their own unique features, but these are a subject for a
different meeting.
When one discusses safety of nuclear power and propulsion, one observes overlapping
and unique areas (Figure 2). Nuclear propulsion rockets have to deal with hydrogen
exhausting out of a nozzle that could contain fission products or radioactive materials.
Nuclear power systems need to be concerned with high burn up and fission products and
actinides formed over long operating times.
It is highly desirable to have a set of generic space safety guidelines. However, such
guidelines do not exist. One document on safety issued in the 1970's, OSNP-1, includes
an overall safety philosophy that pretty well summarizes the U.S. safety philosophy. It
states that the policy of the United States for all U.S. nuclear power sources in space is
to ensure that the probability of release of radioactive material and the amounts released
are such that an undue risk is not presented, considering the benefits of the mission
(Figure 3). Each program, such as SP-100, includes its own version of safety
requirements as part of the specifications.
General safety design requirements are given in Figure 4. In case of an accident, the
reactor must be maintained subcritical if it is immersed in water or other fluids.
Essentially, this relates to launch pad abort situations. Next, the reactor needs to have a
significant effective negative power coefficient--unfortunately, what is meant by
significant is not well defined. No credible launch accident may cause criticality relating
to fires and explosions that could result in a critical reactor generating significant
amounts of radiation. The reason for no reactor operation until a stable flight path is
achieved is for ground personnel safety and safety during launch aborts. The reactor
radiation levels are very low prior to normally planned operation in space. Flight
qualification will probably include a zero power test to check the nuclear physics of the
reactor, but the radiation levels will still be sufficiently low to avoid the need for special
procedures around the reactor on the launch pad. Two independent shutdown systems
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will ensure that the reactor will shutdownwhen commanded. Independent decay heat
removal paths are to avoid core meltdowns in case of a failure in the normal coolant
path.
One important factor in preparing safety requirements is that each requirement should
have an identifiable contribution to reducing safety related risk. The requirements
should be generic and not specify design solutions. In other words, safety requirements
should address safety issues and not particular design concepts.
Undue risk is another concern in arriving at safety requirements. There is no legal
definition for this term. For some, one in a million would be considered an acceptable
definition. Others would argue for some other number. Obviously, the consequences of
an event enter into what we accept as undue risk. The fact that we can not quantitize
the definition makes it difficult for many engineers in system design.
Terrestrial safety factors are given in Figure 5. Testing nuclear electric propulsion power
plants will require at least three independent barriers to radioactive materials being
released to the biosphere. Also, there will need to be an independent decay heat
removal system in case the primary coolant loop fails. Additional safety controls and
instrumentation will be needed to monitor ground test operations.
SP-100 flight system requirements are given in Figure 6. These are part of the SP-100
requirements document. However, the document tends to include design solutions as
part of the specifications. Generic safety specifications are preferable. SP-100 provides
a starting point for nuclear electric propulsion safety specifications preparation.
For manned systems (Figure 7), the safest response to an abnormal event may not be to
shutdown. If a habitat power system going to or on Mars is shutdown, the crew could
lose their life support equipment--not a very safe approach. We are going to have to
think about how to continue operations, even at a somewhat reduced level. Reactor
scram at times is an unacceptable safety action.
From past programs, we can look at lessons learned (Figure 8). Safety must start with
the initiation of the design process! A systematic determination of the effects of all
possible failures is needed right at the beginning of the design process. Countermeasures
must be developed for significant accident situations. The cost and benefits of mitigation
need to be assessed and appropriate remedies applied. Safety must be given more then
lip service and must truly be given primary priority.
SP-100 has recently performed detailed safety studies through all phases: ground
operations, launch, flight and disposal (Figures 9 and 10). The issues are similar to those
that will need to be addressed in nuclear electric propulsion power plants. This has led
to many design features (Figure 11 and 12), such as two independent shutdown systems,
control rods in the core, a special in-core method of cooling the system in case primary
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coolant is lost, and a reentry cone around the reactor.
During ground operations (Figure 13), the key concerns are to prevent accidental
criticality, avoid loss of special nuclear materials to terrorists, and ensure that radiation
levels around the launch pad are sufficiently low to ensure that special precautions are
not necessary for worker safety. The approaches for accomplishing safety, as given on
the figure, are well known.
For launch operations (Figure 14), the key concerns are to prevent accidental nuclear
criticality and to keep foreign countries from acquiring special nuclear material. For
instance, if an abort occurred during launch operations, we do not want special nuclear
material ending up in a foreign country and starting an international incident.
Approaches exist as to how to address these concerns. Redundant neutron poisons can
take care of preventing accidental criticality. In the NERVA program, we not only had
the control drums, but also had wires in the core that would be extracted when the
nuclear stage was separated. This provided independent redundant safety systems.
To ensure that an abort would lead to nuclear material being dispersed over water,
on-board destruct devices are used. Early launch aborts will end up in the Atlantic
Ocean. Later aborts have sufficient momentum to carry the satellite over an ocean
where the destruct device can destroy the satellite.
In flight operations (Figure 15), the key concerns have to do with unplanned reentry into
the biosphere and crew safety. Unplanned reentry can be reduced to very low
probability levels by selecting the flight trajectory to always move towards a safer orbit.
Interlocks can be used to shutdown the reactor if an unsafe condition is sensed. For
crew safety, either redundant systems need to be supplied or means to continue to
operate to bring the crew home. One must decide how much redundancy in engines and
power plants are going to be required to get home safely. One concept is to use seven
engines with a two engine out capability. This changes the thrust level and design
complexity of the engine and drives the whole development program. This issue is
important to resolve at the beginning of the systems engineering process.
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Final disposal (Figure 16) must be considered to avoid reentry of the reactor into the
biosphere or contamination of low Earth orbit. The approach is to avoid bringing it
back to low Earth orbit when feasible and to select orbits to minimize risk. Returning
from Mars, a nuclear thermal rocket can be disposed of in deep space with final capture
of the crew capsule by aerocapture. This way, the nuclear thermal rocket can be
disposed of so that it never passes in the vicinity of the Earth.
Perceived safety (Figures 17 and 18) is an interesting subject because the public's
perception of safety is not the same as actual safety. Figure 17 shows the real safety of
SP-100. It is significantly safer then a transcontinental aircraft flight, diagnostic medical
services, radiation therapy or lifetime natural environments. As experienced in the
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nuclear industry, the real and perceived safety are often very different. The nuclear
industry probably has the safest record of any major industry in this country, but if you
ask the average person on the street, he probably thinks it is more dangerous than
driving a car. Perceived safety is an emotional issue and emotional issues are hard to
deal with. However, this is something that has to be addressed early in the program.
Reducing the real risk to a very low level helps in reducing perceived safety risk.
Turning to licensing, the users must know that launch approval will be granted in a
timely fashion (Figures 19 and 20). A procedure is in place to accomplish this. The
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel performs independent safety/risk evaluations,
the agency flying a payload requests permission for flight, the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) reviews the request and makes the launch decision, the
Executive Office of the President makes the final decision if OSTP feels that it is
appropriate.
The NERVA program design philosophy is given in Figure 21. Safety was a driving
force, in the flight engine design. The NERVA flight engine program and safety plan are
summarized in Figures 22 and 23. They included detailed safety analyses and
experiments and a requirement to be able to continuously provide 30,000 lb thrust in an
emergency mode.
In summary, potential solutions exist to reduce risk to acceptable levels. Unless safety is
considered from design selection and initiation, the cost of safety goes up dramatically.
Not only must the safety risk be reduced to acceptable levels, it must be done in a
manner that the perceived risk to the decision makers and public is acceptably low.
Licensing procedures are in place and the duration of the licensing process is
predictable. Users can count on approval for launch if procedures are followed and
operational constraints are similar to chemical systems.
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Figure 1
SAFETY
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GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES FOR ALL U.S. NUCLEAR POWER
SOURCES IN SPACE IS TO ENSURE THAT THE PROBABILITY OF
RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND THE AMOUNTS RELEASED
ARE SUCH THAT AN UNDUE RISK IS NOT PRESENTED, CONSIDERING
THE BENEFITS OF THE MISSION.
OSNP-1
Figure 3
SAFETY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
• REACTOR DESIGNED TO REMAIN SUBCRITICAL IF IMMERSED IN WATER
OR OTHER FLUIDS
° SIGNIFICANT EFFECTIVE NEGATIVE POWER COEFFICIENT OF
REACTIVITY INCLUDED
• NO CREDIBLE LAUNCH ACCIDENT CAUSES CRTICALITY
• NO REACTOR OPERATION UNTIL STABLE FLIGHT PATH ACHIEVED
• TWO INDEPENDENT SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS
• INDEPENDENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PATH
• UNIRRADIATED FUEL POSE NO SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD
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TERRESTRIAL SAFETY
NUCLEAR ELECTRIC PROPULSION POWER PLANTS
- THREE INDEPENDENT BARRIERS TO RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RELEASE
- INDEPENDENT DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM
- ADDITIONAL SAFETY CONTROLS AND INSTRUMENTATION
NUCLEAR THERMAL ROCKETS
- LOSS-OF-COOLANT FLOW SYSTEM
- SCRUBBERS TO CLEAN EXHAUST OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
- CONTAINMENT/CONFINEMENT UNCERTAIN
- ADDrrlONAL SAFETY CONTROLS AND INSTRUMENTATION
Figure 5
SP-100 FLIGHT SYSTEM
KEY SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
- MAINTAIN REACTOR SUBCRITICAL DURING ACCIDENTS AND DURING PERMANENT DISPOSAL
- FUEL/SAFETY ROD ALIGNMENT
- LAUNCH PAD FIRES
- EXPLOSWONS
- CORE IMPACTION
• INTACT REENTRY FOR SPECIFIED INADVERTENT EVENTS
• ESSENTIALLY INTACT BURIAL FOLLOWING INADVERTENT REENTRY
• HIGH RELIABILITY FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN
• HIGH RELIABILITY FOR SHUTDOWN HEAT REMOVAL
• RETENTION OF REACTOR STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FOR LOS_OF-COOLANT
• SECURE COMMUNICATIONS AND INHIBITS TO PREVENT REACTOR STARTUP PRIOR TO
OPERATIONAL ORBIT
• MINIMIUM USE OF HAZARDS, CHEMICALLY TOXIC MATERIALS
k
ARE THE REQUIREMENTS THE SAME II
FOR NEP POWER PLANTS? !
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SPACE--MANNED
• CONTINUING TO OPERATE MAY BE SAFER THAN SHUTTING DOWN
• MONITORING ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTATION
SAFETY APPROACH
Figure 7
• SYSTEMATICALLY DETERMINE THE EFFECTS OF ALL POSSIBLE
FAILURES
• ADVISE COUNTERMEASURES TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
• ACCESS THE COST AND BENEFITS OF MITIGATION
• RECOMMEND APPROPRIATE REMEDIES
1
MUST START WITH INITIATION OF
THE DESIGN PROCESS! i
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POTENTIAL MISSION ACCIDENTS AND HAZARDS
NON-A, CTIVA TE D CORE
FISSION PRODUCTS IN
CORE FRO_I PC_IER OIDIERATION
5. TRANSFER TO
OPERATING
ORBIT
4, ASCENT TO
PARKING ORBIT
2. TRANSPORTATION
1.
ASSEMBLY
ASSEMBLY
ACCIDENTS
7. PERMANENT DISPOSAL
• BOOSTER FAILURE
• REENTRY AND IMPACT
6. IN-ORBIT
OPERATION
3. LAUNCH PAD
• SPACE DEBRIS IMPACTS
• BOOSTER FAILURES
• REENTRY AND IMPACT
• MISSION ABORTS
• REENTRY AND IMP/I_T_
e • LAUNCH VEHICLE EXPLOSIONS
• INTENSE FIRES
TRANSPORTATION
:IDENTS
Figure 9
SAFETY CONCERNS
• GROUND
• LAUNCH
• FLIGHT
• DISPOSAL
• PERCEIVED
• LICENSING
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KEY SAFETY FEATURES
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INTERFACE
) RING
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Control elements
automatically shut reactor
down upon loss of power
Two Independent shutdown
Systems
Prompt negative reactivity
coefficient assures stable
reactor control
Only 4 out of 12 reflectors
required for shutdown
Fresh core at launch
Large negative void coefficient
enhances shutdown upon loss
of coolant
Control elemenls moved
Individually and In Icremental
amounts to prevent rapid
reactivity addition
Rhenium poison provides
the_rmai neutron absorption
for water flooding
KEY SAFETY FEATURES (CONT.) Figure ll
/
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GROUND OPERATIONS
KEY CONCERNS
- PREVENT ACCIDENTAL CRITICALITY
- AVOID LOSS OF SNM TO TERRORIST
- WORKER CONSTRAINTS AROUND LAUNCH PAD
APPROACHES
- ENGINE TRANSPORT
- CORE HEAVILY POISONED
- WATER-TIGI.n" STRUCTURE
- SI.IIPPING VESSEL FOR "WORS'I _" IMPACT ACCIDENT
- SHIPPED IN PREFERENTIAL MANNER
- LAUNCH PAD OPERATIONS
- KEEP RADIOACTIVE LEVELS BELOW SAFETY LIMITS
- REDUNDANT AND INDEPENDENT NEUTRON POISONS (E.G., POISON RODS IN COOLANT
CHANNELS, LOCKED DRUM SUBSYSTEM)
Figure 13
LAUNCH OPERATIONS
KEY CONCERNS
- PREVENT ACCIDENTAL CRITICALITY
- AVOID FOREIGN COUNTRY ACQUIRING SNM
APPROACHES
- REDUNDANT AND INDEPENDENT NEUTRON POISONS
- ON-BOARD DESTRUCT DEVICES
- FLIGHT PATH IN PREDETERMINED ZONES
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FLIGHT OPERATIONS
KEY CONCERNS
- UNPLANNED REENTRY INTO BIOSPHERE
- RADIOLOGiCAL EFFECTS ON CREW
- RS_ON PRODUCT RELEASE
- CONTINUING OPERATIONS TO GET HOME
APPROACHES
- SELECT ANGLES OF THRUST TO ALWAYS MOVE TO SAFER ORBITS
- SET ORBITS FOR SAFETY
- INTERLOCKS
- ENGINE DESTRUCT SYSTEM
REDUNDANT AND INDEPENDENT REACTOR CONTROL MODES (INCLUDING SET BACK
MODES)
- SHIELDING USING CONFIGURATION, LH2 IN TANK AND SPECIAL MATERIALS
- ENCAPSULATED FUELS
- REDUNDANT ENGINES/POWER PLANTS AND COMPONENTS Figure 15
DISPOSAL
• KEY CONCERNS
REENTRY INTO THE BIOSPHERE
- CONTAMINATION OF LOW EARTH ORBIT
• APPROACHES
- DON'T BRING IT BACK TO LOW EARTH ORBIT
SELECT ORBITS TO MINIMIZE RISK
435 Figure 16
SP-1OO RADIATION EXPOSURE vs. PROBABILITY
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Figure 17
PERCEIVED SAFETY CONCERNS
KEY CONCERNS
REAL AND PERCEIVED RISK CAN BE VERY DIFFERENT
EMOTIONAL ISSUE
APPROACHES
REDUCE REAL RISK TO VERY LOW LEVEL
- OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS MUST BE PLAUSIBLE AND COMPLETE (EX. DISPOSAL)
- EDUCATION OF CONCERNED GROUPS
- AVOID DISCUSSIONS OF PROBABILITIES (USE ANALOGIES)
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LICENSING
KEY CONCERN
- TIMELY LAUNCH APPROVAL
APPROACHES
- CONSIDER SAFETY FROM THE START
- WORK CLOSELY WITH IN PLACE APPROVAL PROCESS
Figure 19
SAFETY APPROVAL PROCESS
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NERVA DESIGN PHILOSOPHY
"THE MAJOR DESIGN CRITERIA FOR THE NERVA ENGINE
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM SHALL BE RELIABILITY AND THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF THE HIGHEST PROBABILITY OF MISSION SUCCESS.
NEXT IN THE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE MUST BE PERFORMANCE AS
MEASURED IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC IMPULSE. THEN THE ENGINE
DESIGN SHOULD ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE OVERALL WEIGHT AS LOW
AS POSSIBLE wri'HIN THE BOUNDS ALLOWED BY FUNDS AVAILABLE
FOR DEVELOPMENT. WHILE THERE ARE INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN
THESE CRITERIA IN DESIGN, I CAN SEE NO BASIS FOR ALTERING
THEIR ORDER OF IMPORTANCE."
MR. MILTON KLEIN (1967)
NERVA FLIGHT SAFETY PROGRAM
Figure 21
• SAFETY PLAN (S-019)
• FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
PROCEDURES (S-019-002)
• FLIGHT SAFETY CONTINGENCY
ANALYSIS REPORT (S-103)
RELIABILITY ALLOCATION,
ASSESSMENTS AND ANALYSIS
REPORT (R202)
• SINGLE-FAILURE-POINT
REPORTING, ANALYSIS,
CORRECTION AND CLOSEOUT
(R101 - NRP-306)
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NERVA SAFETY PLAN
THE MEANS FOR PREVE_ THE INADVERTENT AI"rAINMENT OF REACTOR CRITICALITY
THROUGH ANY CREDIBLE COMBINATION OF FAILAURES, MALFUNCTIONS, OR @PERATII=.S
DURING ALL GROUND, LAUNCH, FLIGHT, AND SPACE OPERATIONS.
A DESTRUCT SYSTEM DURING LAUNCH AND ASCENT TO ASSURE SUFFICIENT DISPERSION
OF THE REACTOR FULE UPON EARTH IMPACT TO PREVENT NUCLER CRITICALITY WITH THE
FUEL FULLY IMMERSED IN WATER.
THE MEANS FOR PREVENTING CREDIBLE CORE VAPORIZATION OR DISINTERGRATION OR
VIOLATION OF THE THRUST-LOAD PATH TO THE PAYLOAD.
DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTATION ADEQUATE TO DETECT THE APPROACH OF A FAILURE OR
AN EVENT THAT COULD INJURE THE CREW OR DAMAGE THE SPACECRAFT AND THE
PROVISIONS TO PRECLUDE SUCH AN EVENT.
THE CAPABIUTY FOR REMOTE OVERRIDE OF THE _ PROGRAMMER BY ":3,'IECREW
AND GRUND CONTROL AS WELL AS FOR REMOTE SHUTDOWN INDEPENDENT OF THE
ENGINE PROGRAM.
AN ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEM CAPABILITY TO PRECLUDE EXCESSIVE OR DAMAGING
DEVIATIONS FROM PROGRAMMED POWER AND RAMP RATES.
PROVIDE AN EMERGENCY MODE ON THE ORDER OF 30,000 Ib-thrust, 500s SPECIFIC
IMPULSE AND 108 Ib-sec TOTAL IMPULSE.
Figure 23
SUMMARY
• POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS EXIST TO REDUCE RISK TO ACCEPTABLE
LEVELS
• THE COST OF SAFETY GOES UP DRAMATICALLY IF NOT CONSIDERED
FROM DESIGN SELECTION AND INITIATION
• PERCEIVE SAFETY CONCERNS MUST BE ADDRESSED
• LICENSING PROCEDURES IN PLACE AND PREDICTABLE
• OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ARE SIMILAR TO CHEMICAL SYSTEMS
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